Mutual Nuclear Deterrence

Mutual Nuclear Deterrence refers to the theory that if two parties both threaten nuclear conflict, neither will engage in it. This became a commonly used strategy during The Cold War. Deterence theory itself is defined as any use of threats in order to maintain the status quo. The stability–instability paradox is an important part of mutual nuclear deterrence. This paradox states that if two parties both have powerful nuclear weapons, the chances of war between them greatly decreases. This is because parties generally want to avoid nuclear conflict, so they neither start large conflicts nor allow small conflicts to grow into large ones.

According to Kenneth Waltz, there are three requirements for successful nuclear deterrence:

1. The state must have a group of nuclear weapons strong enough to fight back if attacked.
2. The state must not respond to false alarms of a strike.
3. The state must keep control.

The idea of mutual nuclear deterrence has been critiqued. This is because of the idea that the people who make decisions are always rational. It has been argued that it does not consider the emotional effects of the chances of a conflict happening, which can lead to irrational choices.