Jo Wallace
Leiden University, History of the Modern Middle East, 2021-22
I am a student enrolled in the course above, whose assessment entails editing a Simple Wikipedia entry. I will be using the space below to draft this entry.
Below are my contributions, written independently of my partner.
(introduction of the topic)
Those killed were nearly all Muslim refugees, and the slaughter was carried out at the discretion of the Lebanese Christian political party by their Phalangist militia. The massacre is today referred to as Sabra and Shatila after the names of the refugee camps that were assaulted in the attack.
(start of war/historical context)
The massacre was preceded by an aggressive invasion of Lebanon prompted by Israeli forces. According to the claims of the invaders and the leaders representing them, the intention of the invasion was to safeguard Israeli citizens and to generally diminish the threat of international terrorism. Because of how these attacks were targeted and the nature of the Israeli army’s invasion, this seemingly mild intentionality would actually mean a siege of West Beirut and destruction of the PLO as well as the surrounding area.
(the Lebanese phalanges)
Formally known as the Christian Maronite Lebanese Forces, the Lebanese Phalanges were the primary Christian militia involved in the Lebanese Civil War. The Maronites first came to Lebanon in an attempt to escape persecution in Syria, and it was at this time that the group was able to build a relationship with European powers, specifically maintaining a connection with France. In addition to the Phalangist militia, there was also a strong Phalangist political party, led most prominently by Pierre Gemayel.
One of the key leaders of the Phalangist military faction was Bachir Gemayel, son to Pierre, and eventually elected president, though he was assassinated in mid-September of the same year he was elected, before having the opportunity to actually take office. His murder was carried out via bombing and perpetrated by Habib Tanious Shartouni, whose allegiance lied with Syria and is known to have been a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Another pertinent figure to the Phalangist group in Lebanon was Elie Hobeika, who was known to have a close relationship with Gemayel and served as a military leader for the Lebanese forces at the time of the war.
(The Palestinian Refugees and Fighters of the PLO)
The PLO, formally the Palestine Liberation Organization, was initially conceived in 1964 with the ultimate intention of creating a Palestinian state. The organization had directly opposition to and conflict with the State of Israel.
Following revolts, Jordanian-Palestinian conflict in the early 1970s, and the events of Black September, a large number Palestinians were forced to flee Jordan and entered Lebanon seeking refuge and a place where they could better face potential confrontation. Both Palestinian refugees and fighters had been privy to large amounts of violence, death, and decimation and sought to establish a place for themselves in Southern areas of Lebanon and in Beirut.
The Palestinian refugees' presence in Jordan played a significant role in the rising tension which eventually led to the Lebanese Civil War. They were the target of several forces, including the Maronites, accompanied by the Lebanese army and several other militias, as well as the Israeli army. As we know, they would eventually become the objective and victims of the Sabra and Shatila massacre.
(The Proceedings: When, Where, How and Why the Massacre Occurred)
In June of 1982, the Israeli army executed an unprecedented invasion of Lebanon in an attempt to effectively obliterate the Palestinian Liberation Organization, its infrastructure, and its allies, inciting continued violence and battle in the area. Part of this attack was a culmination of tensions among Zionists and Phalangists. The Phalanges ultimately sought to achieve dominion over Lebanon, and in particular with concern to religion; they desired a Maronite Christian supremacy in the country and a strict force of control in which they wielded power. They were willing to elevate the ongoing conflict in Lebanon and sanction war and violence to achieve their goals, using a variety of military strategies including a near constant arial strafe of the capital city.
Despite steadfast attempts at resistance from the Palestinian-Lebanese side, violence and death was crescendoing and other actors became involved. Along with several others, the Lebanese prime minister at the time, Shafik Wazzan, and an American representative named Philip Habib were making attempts to diffuse the issue diplomatically. On 11th August 1982, they came to an accord which designated that the PLO would be forcefully removed from Beirut under the direction of both American and European forces, specifically France and Italy. Providing this evacuation of Palestinian troops, the Israeli government made guarantee that their army would not infiltrate west Beirut or perpetrate further attack. They also pledged, in conjunction with the United States government, to assure the safety of the Palestinians and people already inside the refugee camps.
The Shatila camp, located in west Beirut, had been a standing Palestinian refugee camp since the 1940s, established for several years before the massacre took place. Over time, the camp had grown to also include the nearby Sabra neighborhood, and both Sabra and Shatila were in the direct path of the violence being perpetrated by the Israeli forces. However, because of the formal agreement reached by Philip Habib and Shafik Wazzan, the camps and the Palestinian civilians' security should have been safeguarded. This changed following the assassination of Lebanese president Bachir Gemayel, which prompted the Israeli army and the Phalangist militia, whose loyalty was strongly tied to Gemayel, to take action that they considered necessary to regain control in Beirut and protect the area and people within it. This claim of needing to acquire security and safeguard against terrorism was the veneer Israeli forces employed to justify the disruption of their previous promises and the acts of brutality which followed. Many other parties, including the United States, were implicated in the events of the next few days.
On 15th September, the Israeli army was the first power to occupy Sabra and Shatila, closing all access out of the camps and effectively confining thousands of civilians and refugees inside. From 16th to 18th September 1982, the camps were then subjected to an onslaught of violence, rape, abuse, and mass murder. Other groups became involved in carrying out the decimation, including the Lebanese Forces and other right-wing militias. The massacre was an enormous loss of human life, consisting of almost entirely Palestinian refugees and Lebanese civilians, including many women and children, hospital patients, and public servants such as medical staff. There is still uncertainty as to precisely how many were killed in the massacre; some state the death toll to be as low as 300, some claim it's nearer to 1,700, while other estimates range as high as 4,500 victims. Most sources posit that at least 3,000 innocent people were murdered in this 3-day period.
(Cultural Evocations)
From Israel to Damascus the Painful Road of blood, betrayal, and deception, by Robert Maroun Hatem. Often known colloquially as "Cobra", the author of this biography was one of the bodyguards to the book's main person of interest. It is the account of Phalangist leader Elie Hobeika's life, in which his former employee, Hatem, portrays the violence of the war from an inside perspective and offers a decidedly negative overall picture of Hobeika.
(reference list draft -- roughly, APA format)
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